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NICARAGUAN RELATIONS 
WITH THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT 
by HARRY E. VANDEN 
and 
WALTRAUD QUEISER MORALES 
PRONOUNCEMENTS BY THE Reagan Administration not with- 
standing, the oft repeated accusation that Nicaragua is but a Soviet or 
Cuban pawn does not appear consistent with a closer examination of 
the facts (see NACLA, 1985). Beginning with the original 1969 FSLN 
(Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional) Program, the Sandinista 
leadership which now rules Nicaragua has steadfastly maintained its 
nonaligned orientation. In fact, since coming to power, the Sandinis- 
tas have not only become active members of the Nonaligned Move- 
ment, but have also used their ties with the Nonaligned to explain 
their policies and to garner much needed international support for 
their actions. In the process, they appear to have taken full advantage 
of policy options created by the development of the Nonaligned 
Movement and only recently available to Latin American nations. 
The nonaligned movement itself was born in the post-colonial 
period as increasing numbers of Third World nations sought to es- 
tablish a direction in foreign policy which would allow them to en- 
sure a political, if not economic, independence in a world increas- 
ingly dominated by two great powers. Roots of the movement extend 
back to 1955 when a group of Afro-Asian states met as a group to de- 
nounce colonialism, promote economic development, and call for 
relaxation in world tensions. Josip Broz Tito, an early founder of the 
movement, aligned Yugoslavia with the new group, attacking the di- 
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vision of the world into two hostile camps. At the first formal meeting 
of the Nonaligned, twenty-five nations gathered in Belgrade in 1961 
and focused on the need for world peace. Subsequent nonaligned 
summit conferences (Cairo in 1964, Lusaka in 1970, Algiers in 1973, 
Colombo in 1976, Havana in 1979, and New Delhi in 1983) contin- 
ued to mention the importance of an independent foreign policy and 
to advocate non-participation in cold war military pacts (despite Pak- 
istan's alignment with the United States, and Cuba's eventual ties with 
the Soviet Union). 
As Nicaragua would do later, Yugoslavia and a growing number 
of Third World nations used the new group as a mechanism to chart 
their own course in foreign policy and development. Evolution of the 
movement witnessed increasing concern over political hegemony 
and economic domination, particularly by Western powers. Thus, as 
the focus shifted from world peace and maintaining scrupulous 
equidistance between East and West, the new emphasis became one 
of expressing solidarity with anti-colonial struggles, supporting the 
political economy of the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), and openly criticizing perceived Western domination in 
political or economic areas (LeoGrande, 1980: 38, 39). Support for 
liberation movements gradually became the primary focus of the 
movement with some nations, like Yugoslavia and Algeria, warning 
of US and Soviet imperialism (the two imperialisms thesis) with an- 
other, Cuba, arguing that the Socialist countries were natural allies.l 
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
If conditions proceeded to change rapidly in Africa and Asia, the tra- 
ditional Inter-American system made nonalignment a different story 
in the Western Hemisphere, where, from the (1823) Monroe Doc- 
trine onward, the United States had reserved for itself a hegemonic 
position. The United States was to be the first among equals and, as 
such, to enjoy certain rights and responsibilities foreclosed to lesser 
states. As industrial growth in the North economically outstripped 
the rural agrarianism of the South, the Latin American nations wit- 
nessed a variety of policy instruments: the big stick, gunboat and dol- 
lar diplomacy and, finally, the good neighbor policy. Though meth- 
ods might vary, the end result was always the same, i.e. to convince 
the Latin American states to follow the US lead. When subtle meth- 
ods failed, American presidents often sent in the Marines to secure 
the North American interest. Such was the case in Nicaragua, where 
Marines intervened from 1910 to 1925 and from 1926 to 1933. The 
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last occupation was in response to an indigenous guerrilla move- 
ment, Augusto Cesar Sandino's Army in Defense of Nicaraguan Na- 
tional Sovereignty. 
After Sandino was assassinated in 1934 and his army disbanded 
by the US-organized National Guard, the resulting Somoza family 
dictatorship remained in power until July of 1979 and was character- 
ized by almost total subservience to North American policy interests. 
A Somoza could always deliver the Nicaraguan vote in crucial meet- 
ings of the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American 
States (OAS). Nicaragua, like most of her sister republics, remained 
closely allied to the United States through the thirties, forties, fifties, 
and sixties. 
Led by the post-revolutionary independence of Mexican foreign 
policy, other Latin American states pushed to enlarge their parame- 
ters of action in foreign affairs. Argentina, under Per6n, remained 
neutral during most of the Second World War and pursued an inde- 
pendent course in the postwar period. Buenos Aires asserted its in- 
dependence by recognizing the Soviet Union in 1946 and develop- 
ing trade relations with both East and West. Years before the 
Colombo Conference, Peronist foreign policy called for a Third 
Force not aligned with either of the emerging power blocs. 
Peronism appeared to insulate Argentina from the Cold War 
preoccupation that increasingly colored US relations with its Latin 
neighbors. In 1954 Guatemalan attempts at internal structural 
change and a foreign policy involving minimal relations with East- 
ern Europe became the basis for a US campaign characterizing the 
regime as a beachhead for international communism. The subse- 
quent CIA-sponsored (US Central Intelligence Agency) coup termi- 
nated Guatemala's experiment with an independent foreign policy. 
Bolivia's attempts at structural change, following its 1952 revolution, 
lasted only a few years until US-induced economic pressure served 
to moderate the course of revolution (see Blasier, 1971; and White- 
head, 1969). 
Interjection of the Cold War into the hemispheric system under- 
cut attempts at maneuverability on the part of the Latin American na- 
tions, since it was assumed that common cultural, historic, econom- 
ic, and political ties inextricably bound them to the West in the North 
American "cold war" with Eastern Communism. The Cuban case il- 
lustrates how the US reacted (or overreacted) to nationalist changes 
in internal or external economic and political relationships. Devia- 
tion from Western policies was perceived as both unwarranted and 
143 
JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 
active movement toward communism. The kind of foreign policy in- 
itiatives that characterized India's relations with the superpowers 
were tolerated in Asia but prohibited in neighboring Latin 
America. 
In 1961 twenty-five nations convened in Belgrade for the first 
conference of nonaligned nations. Cuba's was the only Latin Ameri- 
can delegation. "Havana's presence signalled that Cuba's internation- 
al perspective was undergoing change; the hemispheric parameters 
that historically had defined its sphere of concern were being re- 
placed with a vision of itself operating in concert with kindred Afro- 
Asian states on the larger world stage" (Erisman, 1983: 150). The 
United States reacted negatively. As Cuba sought new external align- 
ments, US displeasure increased and was ultimately expressed by 
the CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion. At North American initiative, 
Cuba was excluded from full participation in the Inter-American sys- 
tem in 1962. Not only did this act strain the system, but it encouraged 
Cuba to offset its diplomatic isolation through more committed inte- 
gration into the Nonaligned Movement, and (at different times) 
through strengthening ties with the Soviet Union and China. 
The economic and political realities of the sixties, the example 
of Cuba, and a general increase in Third World independence and 
assertiveness combined to encourage other Latin American nations 
to re-evaluate foreign policy options. By the late 1970's an increasing 
number of Latin Americans experienced a growing affinity with the 
kind of Third World nationalism emanating from meetings of the 
Nonaligned Movement. In the years that followed, the movement 
came to include several Latin American nations, not only Cuba, Nica- 
ragua and Peru but also Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Panama. Venezuela, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico attended confer- 
ences as observers. The once-small group of twenty-five had expand- 
ed to nearly one hundred nations by the time the FSLN defeated 
Somoza's forces in July of 1979. 
NICARAGUA AND THE HISTORIC ROOTS 
OF NONALIGNMENT 
In Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future, Luigi 
Einaudi (1974:32) notes that "Latin American nationalism remains 
opposed to any form of dependence on Capitalist or Communist 
powers;" and, further, "most Latin American radicals envisage a form 
of neutralism in world politics, hoping... the sardines can find room 
between the sharks to swim safely." Revolutionary leaders who 
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emerged in Nicaragua were both radical and nationalistic and hoped 
to chart an independent course as the nation experienced its second 
revolution for national sovereignty. Indeed, it would appear that the 
Cubans had warned them of the dangers inherent in alienating one 
shark only to be forced to swim in the wake of another. 
Less than two months after the new government was established 
in Managua, Nicaragua decided to become a member of the Nona- 
ligned Movement and to send a delegation to the Sixth Nonaligned 
Summit, scheduled to convene in Havana early in September 1979. 
Declaring that the Sandinistas favored a restructuring of internation- 
al relations on the basis of justice together with a new international 
economic order, junta member Daniel Ortega (1982:320) explained 
that the Nicaraguans were joining the Nonaligned Movement be- 
cause they saw it as "the broadest organization of the Third World 
states that play an important role and exercise increasing influence 
in the international arena and in the people's struggle against imperi- 
alism, colonialism, neocolonialism ..." Nicaragua was clearly taking 
a different tack from the days when Somoza had declared he was the 
best friend the US ever had. Subsequently, it would seek to diversify 
its diplomatic and economic relations even more. 
To understand reasons for such a shift in Nicaraguan foreign 
policy one needs to examine evolution of the Sandinista movement. 
The object of the nationalism of the original Sandino was to affirm 
the principle of national sovereignty and independence. He identi- 
fied his struggle with that of an oppressed people and believed that 
all those who suffered oppression should unite in a common strug- 
gle (Barricada Internacional, 1984:2). His nationalism sought to lib- 
erate Nicaragua from direct military intervention by, and the political 
and economic dominance of, the United States. Sandino's definition 
of sovereignty was fundamentally anti-hegemonic. Although he an- 
tedated the nonaligned movement, Sandino's appeal to continental 
and global opinion demonstrated the principle of popular solidarity 
and national self-determination which would become the hallmark 
of the Third World movement in Asia and Africa. Characteristically 
anti-colonial, his manifestoes were addressed to struggling peoples 
everywhere: to the Nicaraguan people, the people of America, the 
Indo-Latin American continent, and to all progressive forces (see 
Ramirez, 1980). His anti-colonial sentiment grew out of Nicaraguan 
historical experience and was later to be developed by the FSLN as 
the basis of contemporary Sandinista foreign policy. Thus the Nona- 
ligned Movement provided a "natural, friendly" forum in which to 
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express the new policy goals of political pluralism, mixed economy 
and international nonalignment. The September 1979 Sixth Summit 
of the Non-Aligned countries in Havana provided an ideal occasion 
to announce the new Nicaraguan foreign policy (Tinoco, 1984). 
Through the Nonaligned Movement, Nicaragua began to seek sup- 
port outside the Inter-American System. 
As was true of other Third World countries, the historical roots 
of Sandinista nonalignment were also socio-economic. The new for- 
eign policy which emerged in 1979 was but the external reflection 
of an internal realignment of class and economic forces destined to 
revolutionize both domestic and foreign policies. When the Somoc- 
ista system of economic and political domination was broken, with 
it went its "captive" foreign policy. Pre-revolutionary dependencies 
were challenged; the national interest was defined on Nicaraguan 
(not US) terms. Greater diversification in diplomatic and economic 
relations was sought as a way to achieve the new national goals. Nica- 
ragua would no longer automatically follow the US (or Western) lead 
on policy issues. Rather, it would pursue a foreign policy based on its 
redefined interests. Specific goals might change, but fundamental 
tenets would include nonalignment, anti-colonialism, and pluralism 
in internal politics and international relations. 
Nonalignment came to express a newfound independence. 
From a foreign policy which had faithfully "echoed" the opposition 
of the United States in international and regional forums, like the 
United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) (Nic- 
aragua had endorsed the intervention in Guatemala in 1954, and had 
permitted the use of Puerto Cabezas for the 1961 Bay of Pigs inva- 
sion of Cuba), Nicaraguan foreign policy became fiercely indepen- 
dent. Nonalignment seemed the most effective way to protect its 
new autonomy. Unlike its past subservience to US interests, Nicara- 
guan nonalignment might in future mean criticism of the North 
American position in Latin America and the Third World. However, 
this would not necessarily mean that Nicaraguan foreign policy was 
categorically hostile to that of the United States, but that the new re- 
gime reserved the right to judge other nations' actions according to 
its own criteria. Nicaraguan nonalignment must, therefore, be under- 
stood within the context of the country's revolutionary experience. 
The struggle from Sandino to the present imposed a psycholog- 
ical, moral, and even political commitment to support other libera- 
tion efforts. A basic condition of membership in the Nonaligned 
Movement was support for anti-colonial liberation movements. 
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Clearly there was a natural convergence between the goals of the 
movement and the historical/philosophical base upon which Nica- 
raguan foreign policy rested. Thus it would be unreasonable for Nic- 
araguan foreign policy to ignore other revolutionary struggles, 
whether in Central America or other regions of the Third World, sim- 
ply to demonstrate a nonalignment defined by the United States. Be- 
cause of its history, the "natural" foreign policy direction of Nicara- 
gua sometimes took positions viewed as anti-American. This was 
due as much to the way in which the US defined its foreign policy, 
as to the way in which the Nicaraguans conceptualized theirs. In- 
deed, it may be next to impossible for Nicaragua to define a nona- 
lignment sufficiently consonant with that of the United States since 
to do so would suggest continuation of a dependent foreign policy, 
even the "Finlandization" of Nicaragua's external aspirations. 
THE BIRTH OF A NON-ALIGNED POLICY: 
THE SIXTH SUMMIT 
"The Nicaraguan people have earned the right to be here today with 
their own blood. In this way they have broken with their past history 
of servility to imperialist politics (Ortega, 1983:14) 
Daniel Ortega, Sixth Summit of the Nonaligned Movement 
Nicaragua's entry into the ranks of the Nonaligned implied adoption 
of an anti-imperial policy; it sought to amplify the role of Third 
World countries in world affairs and, by extension perhaps, to an- 
nounce its own new activist role. Daniel Ortega justified member- 
ship specifically in terms of the struggle of peoples against imperial- 
ism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, Zionism, and 
other forms of oppression. He declared Nicaragua's support for the 
principles of peaceful coexistence, the absence of blocs and military 
alliance systems, justice in international relations, and establishment 
of a new international economic order (Ortega, 1983:17). 
Ortega argued that "in the Sandinista revolution there is not any 
alignment; but an absolute and consistent support for the aspirations 
of peoples who have achieved independence or are struggling to do 
so. That is why we are nonaligned" (Ortega, 1983:17). This reason- 
ing helps to explain Nicaragua's subsequent endorsement of SWAPO 
in Namibia, the PLO, the Polisario in the Spanish Sahara, East Timor's 
independence, Cuba, and Puerto Rican nationalism during the meet- 
ing. Nicaragua thereby assumed a position consistent with that of the 
Nonaligned Movement. Meetings of the nonaligned group from the 
Foreign Ministers Conference in Georgetown, in August 1972, to the 
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1979 Havana Summit meeting had all passed resolutions extending 
solidarity and support to these groups. Nicaragua's upport, there- 
fore, was not unusual for the movement but represented its main- 
stream thinking. 
Previously the Nicaraguans had received backing in their libera- 
tion struggle; now they would support similar struggles elsewhere. 
At the foreign ministers meeting held in New York, on 2 October 
1978, the Nonaligned Movement had supported the ongoing revolu- 
tion in Nicaragua by issuing a resolution criticizing the Somoza gov- 
ernment (Nicaragua. Ministerio del Exterior, n.d.). Subsequent min- 
isterial meetings (New Delhi, February 9-13, 1981; Havana, May 
31-June 5, 1982; and October 4-9, 1982) of the Nonaligned coun- 
tries continued to follow post-revolutionary developments in Nicara- 
gua, focusing global attention on Central American instability, grow- 
ing political and economic pressure on Nicaragua, and the 
interventionist role of-the United States in El Salvador (Nicaragua. 
Ministerio del Exterior, n.d.). For example, the ministerial meeting 
at New Delhi "condemned the political and economic aggression, 
both direct or through certain international financial organizations, 
which was being exercised or attempted against Nicaragua in order 
to interfere with the revolutionary process" (Nicaragua. Ministerio 
del Exterior, n.d.). By the early 1980's, the meetings of the Nona- 
ligned Movement had become the principal place where Nicaragua's 
foreign policy position could be explained and understood. As Nica- 
ragua supported other liberation movements, so would others sup- 
port its revolution. Doing so became a matter of diplomatic survival. 
That was why the "Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Coordi- 
nating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries on Latin American and 
the Caribbean," in Managua, from January 10 to 14, 1983, was so 
important. 
NONALIGNMENT AND DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION 
This special ministerial meeting served as something of a diplomat- 
ic "coup" for Nicaragua. First of all world attention was attracted to 
the small nation as delegates from 89 countries, liberation groups, 
and international institutions, all converged as both members and 
observers. Locating the meeting in Managua also contributed to the 
diplomatic (as well as economic and political) survival of the San- 
dinista government for, as Alan Riding observed, "by acting as host 
at the meeting... Nicaragua appeared to have succeeded in focusing 
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(attention) on the growing number of attacks by Honduras-based 
anti-Sandinista rebels into northern Nicaragua" (Riding, 1983a:7). 
Initially, the declaration prepared by Nicaragua and Cuba 
"called specifically for condemnation of US support for anti- 
Sandinista groups based in Honduras" (Riding, 1983b:4). Subse- 
quently, however, some of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) mod- 
erates sympathetic to the United States (such as Jamaica, Egypt, and 
Singapore) were able to "soften" the final draft,2 so that it called 
merely for peaceful resolution of the differences between the war- 
ring groups in El Salvador, and for negotiations to take place between 
the United States and Nicaragua. It was significant, though, that the 
meeting concentrated primarily upon the situation in Central Ameri- 
ca, the first time the NAM had devoted so much of its attention to one 
region of the world, and particularly to Latin America (Tinoco, 
1984). Henceforth Latin American problems would no longer be the 
exclusive province of the OAS, so often dominated by the US, nor 
would Nicaragua be isolated from the world movement it had 
helped to develop. 
The Managua meeting also served two other functions: (1) it set 
the stage to continue discussion of the Central American situation at 
the upcoming summit conference scheduled to be held in New 
Delhi two months later (7-12 March, 1983); and (2) it contributed 
to a marshalling of diplomatic support when, also in March 1983, 
Nicaragua brought complaints of acts of aggression directed against 
itself before the Security Council. 
Nicaragua had already reaped some rewards from its new inter- 
nationalized foreign policy the previous Fall, when it had been elect- 
ed as one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council on 
19 October 1982. At the time the United States had lobbied vigor- 
ously against Nicaragua for this position, preferring to support the 
nomination of the Dominican Republic instead. Despite this power- 
ful opponent Nicaragua had succeeded in mustering the 104 coun- 
try votes needed to acquire the two-thirds majority. Nicaragua's elec- 
tion was widely perceived as a major defeat for the United States 
(Keesing's, 1983: 31933).3 The election was significant in that it also 
provided Nicaragua with immediate access to the Security Council 
in the event of a threat to its national security.4 
Six months later, on 23 March 1983, Nicaragua took advantage 
of this status and requested that the Security Council convene to 
hear such a charge. Nicaragua denounced US aggression in the form 
of increasing counter-revolutionary attacks from Honduras, suggest- 
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ing they were just the most recent examples of the Reagan Admini- 
stration's CIA-orchestrated secret war (UN Chronicle, 1983b: 3-22). 
As had been the case at the New Delhi summit of the NAM, 
Nicaragua's position was reaffirmed by the UN.5 'After four days ofoc- 
casionally heated debate on the fighting in Nicaragua, the US [be- 
came] virtually isolated in the Security Council in its attempts to por- 
tray the conflict as an internal Nicaraguan affair" (Nossiter, 1983:I, 
1). 
Countries frequently allied with the United States in the past 
were now either skeptical or openly critical of US policy in Central 
America, specifically as it affected Nicaragua. Among them were 
Mexico, Venezuela, Spain, Pakistan, India, the Netherlands, Panama, 
and France. Support for Nicaragua was even stronger among sympa- 
thetic nonaligned nations like Tanzania, Zaire and Algeria. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick was so annoyed at their attitude that she was quoted as 
having roundly condemned the "systematic bias, systematic lies, sys- 
tematic redefinition of key political values and distortion of key polit- 
ical processes" (U.N. Chronicle, 1983b: 18).6 This development cer- 
tainly validated Nicaragua's policy of nonalignment which had 
intended to use the Third World movement not just as a forum for 
dissemination of objective, sympathetic information on the Nicara- 
guan revolution, but as a medium for diplomatic defense and initia- 
tive. Tellingly, only Honduras and El Salvador sided strongly with the 
United States in the UN debates. The Nonaligned Movement, and 
through it, other nonaligned Third World countries in the United Na- 
tions, came to the defense of the Nicaraguan revolution. Unlike Gua- 
temala in 1954, Nicaragua was not isolated and overthrown by a CIA- 
backed invasion. Nicaraguan diplomacy had guaranteed its access to 
Third World countries and extra-hemispheric organizations not sub- 
ordinated to policy constraints imposed by regional US hegemony. 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTION: 
THE SEVENTH SUMMIT AND AFTER 
At the very first meeting of the NAM attended by Nicaragua, in 1979, 
paniel Ortega had linked consolidation of the Nicaraguan Revolu- 
tion with strengthening the struggle of other underdeveloped na- 
tions. At the Seventh Summit he made it clear that the struggle for lib- 
eration in Nicaragua continued, and that Nicaragua "needed the 
disinterested assistance of the nonaligned nations" more than ever 
(U.N. Chronicle, 1983b:25). Both these and subsequent declara- 
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tions indicated two important aspects of Nicaraguan foreign policy 
in its relations with the Third World. Like Guatemala and Cuba at an 
earlier time, Nicaragua was totally occupied with the security threat 
posed by the US, and feared for consolidation of its revolution. Un- 
like Cuba between 1959 and 1962, however, Nicaragua decided to 
create the appropriate international climate for revolutionary consol- 
idation by establishing close solidarity with the Third World, rather 
than with the Soviet Union.7 Internationalism, but of a somewhat dif- 
ferent variety than the internationalism of Cuba, was seen as a major 
weapon for national self-defense. Through a "diversified depen- 
dence" on many different nations, but with special ties to the nona- 
ligned countries, Nicaragua hoped to fend off aggressive actions by 
the US.8 Unlike Cuba, Nicaragua was able to avoid a hemispheric dip- 
lomatic isolation imposed by the United States. As more and more 
Latin American countries joined the Nonaligned Movement (at New 
Delhi membership increased to 101 countries including 10 Latin 
American and Caribbean members) it became more difficult to iso- 
late Nicaragua in the same way as had been done with Cuba. The 
new arena was broader, the national actors more independent. 
Nicaragua attempted to act as a bridge between the positions of 
the radical members of the Nonaligned Movement and the pro- 
Western countries. It accepted neither the "natural ally" thesis of 
Cuba, which saw in the socialist countries, especially the Soviet 
Union, a natural alliance of dependent, developing countries; nor 
had Nicaragua espoused the "two imperialisms" thesis of Algeria, 
who feared domination of both advanced capitalist and advanced so- 
cialist systems over dependent countries (Erisman, 1983:157-164 
and Envio, 1983:10). Nicaragua's preferred position in previous 
summits appeared to be with the "pivotal" states (like Tanzania). 
These were not as radical as the Cubans but more radical than the Yu- 
goslavs: they were in the middle of the nonaligned group.9 This 
"middle group" practiced true "flexible nonalignment," at times sid- 
ing with the radicals and at others with the moderates, depending 
upon issue and circumstance. Nicaragua, in confronting the military 
and economic opposition of the United States, and the extensive 
needs of revolutionary reconstruction, could not afford ideological, 
or any other form of, exclusivity. Moreover, its policy in action, as well 
as in philosophy, proved to be genuinely "more" nonaligned than 
that of Cuba. 
A major issue confronted Nicaragua shortly after its revolution, 
and after its delegation had been seated in the United Nations: the 
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Nicaraguan vote on Afghanistan 
has been repeatedly cited as an example of Nicaragua's upport of 
the Soviet Union and of its incorporation into the Soviet bloc, to para- 
phrase US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick (U.N. Chronicle, 
1983b:14). US pronouncements aside, Nicaragua did not vote with 
the Soviet bloc nations. On 14 January 1980, in the Sixth Emergency 
Special Session of the United Nations, under the "uniting for peace 
resolution," the members voted 104 in favor, 18 opposed (with 18 ab- 
stentions) on a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan. 
The question of Afghanistan proved to be a difficult one for Nic- 
araguan foreign policy. On the one hand there was clear sympathy for 
a small Third World nation caught in the hegemonic embrace of a su- 
perpower who considered military intervention a policy option. On 
the other hand, the Afghan guerrillas were opposed to policies to 
which the Sandinistas were fundamentally committed: literacy cam- 
paigns; mass education; equality for women; and social change. 
While the Nicaraguans wanted to adhere to their stated policy of 
nonintervention, at the same time prudence advised that they not al- 
ienate themselves from a potential supporter (the USSR) or from 
those who might become (if the US imposed the same constraints it 
had on Cuba) a potential economic lifeline (the Eastern bloc). 
Both superpowers made the Afghan vote a test of support, if not 
a sine qua non for further friendly relations. The USSR put consider- 
able pressure on friendly regimes to vote against the resolution. This 
was reflected in the final vote; those voting against included both 
Soviet-bloc nations and those Nonaligned countries sympathetic to 
the Soviet Union: Cuba, Angola, Grenada, Ethiopia and Mozam- 
bique. During the debate, Nicaragua included "the presence of Sovi- 
et forces" in Afghanistan among the events which threatened world 
peace (U.N. Chronicle, 1980:5-7), which may have led some West- 
ern nations to believe that Nicaragua would vote for the solution to 
withdraw. Such was not the case. Nicaragua did not vote with the ma- 
jority of Nonaligned; rather, it opted for the studiously neutral posi- 
tion of nonaligned nations like India, Algeria, Cyprus and Finland by 
abstaining. It followed the same course on the second Afghan vote 
in 1984. Similarly, in the September 1983 Security Council resolu- 
tion criticizing the Soviet downing of the Korean airliner, in which 
269 died, Nicaragua again abstained, as did China, Guyana, and Zim- 
babwe, on grounds that doubts as to the facts existed (U.N. Chroni- 
cle, 1983a:19). 
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Nicaragua's interpretation of nonalignment was not always one 
of neutrality, as illustrated by the Nicaraguan position on the US inva- 
sion of Grenada. In October 1983, Nicaragua initiated a resolution in 
the Security Council to end armed intervention in Grenada and to 
begin immediate withdrawal of troops, deploring this as a violation 
of international aw by the US. When the resolution was vetoed by the 
US, in the Security Council, Nicaragua then reintroduced it in the 
General Assembly in November, where the US action was deplored 
by a vote of 108 for and 9 against, with 27 abstaining. Nicaragua not 
only supported the resolution but was its author and promoter. In the 
debate Nicaragua described the US intervention as "naked armed ag- 
gression" (U.N. Chronicle, 1983a:15). Some observers interpreted 
the Grenada vote as proof of Nicaragua's anti-American (and, by im- 
plication, pro-Soviet) alignment. An alternative explanation flows 
from an appreciation of the geographical proximity of Grenada to 
Nicaragua and the comparisons that had previously been made be- 
tween Grenada and Nicaragua by the Reagan Administration and by 
the Nicaraguans themselves, in which the Grenadian intervention 
had been described as a "dry run" for Nicaragua. Faced with an ap- 
parent threat to its security, the Nicaraguans reasoned that the Grena- 
dian intervention was a precedent which had to be forcefully con- 
demned both to uphold the principle of non-intervention and to 
protect the Nicaraguan revolution. 
If the United States interpreted the Nicaraguan votes on Afghan- 
istan and Grenada in terms of "he who is not with us is against us,"1 
the nonaligned nations did not. Nicaragua's election to the Security 
Council, in contrast to the earlier failure of Cuba to be so elected, in- 
dicated that Nicaragua had been accepted by the Nonaligned nations 
as one of them. In contrast to Nicaragua's election to the Security 
Council, Cuba's 1980 bid for a council seat had been blocked by 
India and Nigeria, and the election deadlocked after 156 ballots. Al- 
though Cuba chaired the Nonaligned Movement at the time, it was 
viewed by many in the movement as too radical and not truly nona- 
ligned (LeoGrande, 1980:50). The support for Nicaragua's charges 
of US aggression at the March 1983 New Delhi Seventh Summit of 
Nonaligned nations and in the United Nations in March, May, and 
September of the same year, all evidenced the growing acceptance 
of Nicaragua among members of the NAM and the world community 
at large. At the 38th General Assembly Daniel Ortega emphasized 
this point: "There is agreement among very different ideological po- 
sitions throughout the world in condemning the aggressive and bel- 
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licose escalation occurring in the Central American region and in de- 
manding that dialogue be the means for resolving these problems" 
(U.N. Chronicle, 1984a:12). 
In the Nonaligned Movement, as in the United Nations, Nicara- 
gua avoided siding with either the most radical or the most conserva- 
tive blocs. Unless its national interest or foreign policy goals were di- 
rectly involved, Nicaragua has tried to establish a position both 
flexible and conciliatory, strongly affirming the principle of nona- 
lignment while emphasizing opposition to imperialism and support 
for liberation struggles. Nicaragua perceives unity as the movement's 
greatest strength and exerting leverage in the international forum, 
especially in the reform of the international economic system, a 
major Nicaragua goal. 
In the first UN session in which the Sandinista government was 
represented, Daniel Ortega employed the term "the unity of the 
weak'" and, at the 1983 Managua NAM ministerial meeting, he ex- 
plained the Nicaraguan position: 
It is true that ours are countries with their own characteristics and 
even with diverse ideological and political positions, but they are 
also countries with shared problems and objectives. Ours are poor, 
dependent countries in an unfair economic order that are exposed to 
political, military and economic attacks and pressures; countries that 
cannot win the battle for justice and freedom individually; countries 
that need large-scale solidarity in order to stand up against the op- 
pression that the colonial, industrial, and technological metropoles 
have institutionalized, bringing pain and poverty to our peoples. 
Therefore, the most important thing to preserve is the unity of 
this Movement. Our enemy knows of our differences and will try to 
play on them in order to divide, fragment and destroy us (NAM, 
1983:37-38). 
The Seventh Summit of the Movement highlighted the convergence 
of Third World interests and goals with those of Nicaraguan foreign 
policy. Defense of the Nicaraguan revolution and its consolidation by 
means of Third World solidarity would benefit both Nicaragua and 
the Nonaligned Movement, Nicaragua argued. Daniel Ortega even 
termed Nicaragua as the "strategic reserve of the Nonaligned Coun- 
tries Movement" (Nicaragua. Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting, 
1983:42). The 7th summit (March 1983) issued the strongest de- 
nunciation to that date of contra and US acts of aggression against 
Nicaragua, described there as "a deliberate plan to harass and de- 
stabilize that country" (CIC, 1983:15). 
Continued attacks on Nicaraguan territory, mining of its har- 
bors, and several naval attacks prompted Nicaragua's foreign ministry 
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to intensify its diplomatic activities in the United Nations, the Orga- 
nization of American States, the Contadora Group, before the Inter- 
national Court of Justice, and especially in the Nonaligned Move- 
ment, as measures designed to ease the critical situation in Central 
America. In March 1984 Nicaragua denounced external attacks on its 
territory in the UN Security Council and also succeeded in conven- 
ing an emergency session of the Coordinating Bureau of the Nona- 
ligned Movement (Barricada, 1984:5). The diplomatic offensive was 
particularly urgent to counteract approval by the US Senate of $21 
million to fund (a) covert CIA operations in the region, (b) US mili- 
tary aid to Honduras and (c) escalation of US troop and naval maneu- 
vers in the region. Nicaragua denounced the US attempt to "create 
the political, propagandistic, and international psychological condi- 
tions for the acceptance of the presence of permanent North Ameri- 
can combat troops in Central America" (El Nuevo Diario, 1984a:9). 
Other initiatives included obtaining a decision by the Geneva-based 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that reduction of 
the US sugar quota from 58,000 short tons to 6,000 had been dis- 
criminatory and politically motivated (Barricada, 1984b:21 and El 
Nuevo Diario, 1984b:1 and 10). 
Like many small nonaligned nations, Nicaragua looked to inter- 
national law and the World Court to protect its sovereignty. As the full 
dimension of the Reagan Administration's involvement with the 
counterrevolutionaries (contras) emerged, the Nicaraguan Govern- 
'ment decided to take its well-documented case of US intervention 
before the International Court ofJustice (ICJ), where the Sandinistas 
achieved another diplomatic victory. In May of 1984, the ICJ unani- 
mously called upon the US to "immediately cease and refrain from 
any actions restricting, blocking or endangering access to or from 
Nicaraguan ports, and in particular, the laying of mines" while a final 
decision on the Nicaraguan complaint was being considered. On 26 
November 1984 the World Court denied the US claim that the Court 
lacked standing to hear the complaint and ruled that it did indeed 
have jurisdiction in the case, which Nicaragua, with the help of the 
US law firm of Reichter and Applebaum, had brought before it (New 
York Times: 1984). Reagan Administration attempts to question the 
jurisdiction of the court clearly cost it international and domestic 
support and helped to underline the illegality of US actions support- 
ing the contras Revelations regarding the CIA Manual plus docu- 
mented atrocities by the contrasproved to be major factors in the ini- 
tial refusal of the US Congress to continue to fund the contras, and 
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they further buttressed Nicaragua's credibility with the Nonaligned 
Movement." 
CONCLUSION 
Nicaragua's active and successful participation in the Nonaligned 
Movement demonstrates a close affinity between its historical expe- 
rience and philosophical foundations and those of other anti- 
colonial, developing nations. Nicaragua's stature in the movement is 
largely the consequence of a foreign policy of greater diversity and 
flexibility than that of Cuba, that is, it is a truly nonaligned foreign 
policy. The world, despite repeated assertions to the contrary by the 
Reagan Administration, is not clearly divided into East and West. This 
reality has given Nicaragua more alternatives than were open to 
Cuba earlier. Nicaragua has managed to break the hemispheric mold 
by not limiting its foreign policy options. Diversity in foreign policy 
has been expressed by establishing relations across a broad front en- 
compassing Western European countries, the Nonaligned nations, 
Latin America, and the Socialist bloc. The international assistance re- 
ceived, patterns of international trade, and voting records in interna- 
tional organizations demonstrate both diversity and 
nonalignment.12 
Since 1979, the Sandinista regime has charted a new, highly in- 
dependent foreign policy course. In so doing, it not only placed itself 
squarely within the Nonaligned Movement but was able to bring the 
Movement's perspectives and politics to bear on Nicaragua's position 
as an independent state in a region traditionally dominated by as- 
sumptions of US hegemony. This new foreign policy has maximized 
the decisionmaking latitude of Nicaragua and made nonalignment 
much more possible for other Latin American states. When the Rea- 
gan regime was unsympathetic to Nicaragua, through initiatives at 
Nonaligned Summit meetings and in the UN, the Sandinista govern- 
ment achieved a series of diplomatic successes and foreign policy 
firsts, and, on at least one occasion even managed to isolate the US 
in the United Nations on the basis of the latter's aggressive actions to- 
ward Nicaragua. 
True to its origins and to its nonaligned foreign policy, Nicara- 
gua has carefully cultivated relations with the Nonaligned Move- 
ment and has used these ties to acquire support at a crucial time in 
the development of its revolution. Thus, at the very time that the US 
was increasing external pressure on Nicaragua in early 1983, the 
Nicaraguan government succeeded in hosting a special meeting of 
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Nonaligned ministers. The resulting "Managua Communique" sup- 
ported the Nicaraguan position and criticized US policy in the region 
(Keesing's, 1983:32349-55). The public attention forced the US and 
Honduras to proceed much more carefully than before,thus mini- 
mizing the possibility of direct invasion of Nicaraguan territory. 
The Nonaligned Movement has maximized decision autonomy; 
it has provided a true third alternative by which a small dependent 
nation like Nicaragua can exert influence and achieve foreign policy 
goals. As a forum to disseminate information to the peoples of the 
world, the Nonaligned Movement has served as a natural instrument 
of denunciation of US actions against the Nicaraguan government. 
Membership in the Nonaligned Movement has permitted Nicaragua 
to marshal extracontinental support for its policies and the necessary 
votes to counteract US influence in the OAS and the United Nations. 
From a Nicaraguan perspective, the Movement has been central to its 
foreign policy priorities of self-defense, internationalism, and 
autonomy. 
The revolutionary government carefully cultivated good rela- 
tions with all segments of the Nonaligned Movement (and other na- 
tions who respect nonalignment) and utilized those ties successful- 
ly to achieve its policy objectives. By doing so, Nicaragua was able to 
restrain the type of CIA-organized, externally-based aggressive ac- 
tion that had overthrown the Arbenz Government in Guatemala in 
1954. Likewise, it was able to forestall the type of diplomatic and 
economic isolation which had forced Cuba to rely ever more heavily 
on the Soviet Union. Finally, a small Central American state has been 
able to show that there are indeed many schools of fish in the oceans 
of the world and that one need not swim in the wake of any one large 
fish for fear of being eaten by another (see Arevalo, 1961). 
NOTES 
1. Radicalization of the Nonaligned Movement strained the definition 
of nonalignment. More than rhetorical battles, the success and solidarity of 
the movement involved its self-definition. Critics of the nonaligned have fo- 
cused upon the movement's confusion as deviations from true neutralism. 
Members of the movement have themselves disputed non-consensual in- 
terpretations of non-alignment, witness the 1979 Havana Summit 
Meeting. 
One interpretation of nonalignment was given by Nigeria's UN ambas- 
sador, Akporode Clark: "there are no natural allies" for the nonaligned. 
That is, nonalignment requires flexibility in alignment, a tendency which 
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may shift over time and with circumstance, according to a nation's interests, 
and not be locked into any particular camp. (LeoGrande, 1980:51.) 
2. Egypt had been critical of the Cuban position in the Movement ever 
since the 1978 Foreign Ministers' meeting in Belgrade, and had challenged 
Cuba's credentials as a nonaligned nation. In turn, at the 1979 Havana sum- 
mit, Cuba succeeded in obtaining an 18-month suspension of Egypt from 
the Movement because of the Camp David accords. Singapore, also unsym- 
pathetic to the Cuban position in the movement (along with Sri Lanka, Ma- 
laysia, India, and Yugoslavia), opposed Cuban and Vietnamese support of 
the pro-Soviet Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea (Cambodia) 
against the pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime. (LeoGrande, 1980:45,48, and 49.) 
3. Nicaragua was elected as one of 54 members of ECOSOC (UN Eco- 
nomic and Social Council) untilJanuary 1984. For further interpretation of 
the UN events also see the New York Times (1983) and the UN Chronicle 
(1983b). The Nicaraguan address and charges of US aggression were de- 
bated on 23-25 and 28-29 March, 1983. 
4. As an historical note, it should be pointed out that Guatemala was 
denied access to the UN Security Council in 1954 when the US representa- 
tive, who served as president for that month, refused to place the Guatema- 
lan charges on the agenda, referring the issue to the US-dominated OAS. 
See inter alia, Immerman (1982). 
5. Panama, for example, interpreted the Nicaraguan action in the UN 
as confirming the assessment of the situation in Central America made by 
the New Delhi summit meeting of Nonaligned countries (UN Chronicle, 
1983b:16). 
6. Algeria, for example, was outspoken in its support: "The Sandinist 
Revolution represented the ultimate rehabilitation of peoples through the 
triumph of freedom and justice over oppression and repression. That was 
why it had won deep sympathy and broad support throughout the world, 
which was reflected in Nicaragua being accorded a seat in the Council and 
being welcomed to the Nonaligned Movement as a democratic force. Alge- 
ria hoped the Council would deter all aggressive and destabilizing at- 
tempts against Nicaragua" (UN Chronicle, 1983b:18). 
7. To compare with Cuba, see Erisman (1983:150). 
8. Term used in Envio (1983:12). This was also the thesis of Xavier 
Gorostiaga, who described "the diversification of economic and political 
dependence" as a way to maintain geopolitical and geostrategic balance 
with the US and forge a new regional, geopolitical solution to the Central 
American crisis (Gorostiaga, 1984:34 & 47-48). 
9. LeoGrande (1980:50) used these phrases and concepts, although 
not in reference to Nicaragua. 
10. Term used byJordan in support of Nicaragua in the UN debate of 
March 1983, see UN Chronicle (1983b:19). 
11. See, inter alia, Americas Watch Report (1985), to wit, "In combi- 
nation, the contra forces have systematically violated the applicable laws 
of war throughout the conflict. They have attacked civilians indiscrimi- 
nately; they have tortured and mutilated prisoners; they have murdered 
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those placed hors de combat by their wounds; they have taken hostages; 
and they have committed outrages against personal dignity" (p. 6). This re- 
port also, however, noted same abuses by the Nicaraguan government in 
1981 and 1982 but noted that they ceased after 1982 (p. 4). 
12. Aid and trade figures vary. An Envio (1983:12-13) study, based on 
the work of Gorostiaga and others, noted international loans to Nicaragua 
in these percentages: 49.4% from Third World countries; 32% from capital- 
ist countries, and 18.5% from Socialist bloc countries (including Cuba). 
From 1979-1982 Western Europe provided 33% of Nicaraguan loans. The 
Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry did not provide exact figures but indicated 
that the primary source of economic assistance to Nicaragua was from Latin 
America, particularly Mexico, Venezuela, and Cuba; Argentina, Colombia 
and Brazil had also extended credits. The assistance of the Arab countries, 
particularly Libya and Algeria, had been essential as a major source of liq- 
uid assets as opposed to credit lines. Trade statistics indicated that 31% of 
Nicaraguan exports were with the US, 29% with Central and South Ameri- 
ca; imports were 55% from Central and South America, 27% from the US, 
10% from Western Europe, and 2% from Socialist countries. In Barricada In- 
ternacional (Archives Barricada, 1983: 3) trade for 1983 was given as 47% 
of imports from the Third World, 19% from the United States, and 12% from 
Socialist countries. Since 1979, Nicaraguan leaders have traveled widely 
around the world: Daniel Ortega to the United Nations (US), India, Mexi- 
co, Panama, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, and 
many Asian countries; Sergio Ramfrez throughout Western Europe, the So- 
cialist countries and Asia; Tomas Borge to France, Spain, West Germany, Ita- 
ly, Portugal, Greece, The Netherlands, and Libya; and other leaders to Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Belgium, and so on (also see Malley, 1985; and Schwab and 
Sims, 1985). Foreign Ministry views are based on an interviewwith Deputy 
Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco (1984). 
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